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The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Pennsylvania
Constitution Does Not Bar the Death Penalty upon

Retrial After the Trial Judge Grants a Life Sentence
on Behalf of a Hung Jury: Commonwealth v.
Sattazahn
CRIMINAL LAW -

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

SENTENCING AND PUNISHMENT

The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause
of the Pennsylvania Constitution does not bar the imposition of the
death penalty upon retrial when, in the original sentencing hearing,
the trial judge grants a life sentence on behalf of a hung jury.
DOUBLE

JEOPARDY

-

HARSHER

PENALTY

UPON

RETRIAL

-

Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 763 A.2d 359 (Pa. 2000)
On the night of April 12, 1987, David Allen Sattazahn
("Sattazahn") and co-conspirator Jeffrey Hammer ("Hammer")
carried out a robbery that they had planned for several weeks
against restaurant manager Richard Boyer ("Boyer"). 1 As Boyer left
the restaurant, the two men confronted him and when Boyer
attempted to flee, both Sattazahn and Hammer fired shots which
2
left Boyer dead in the parking lot.

During a police inquiry in 1989, Hammer made a statement that
incriminated both he and Sattazahn as accomplices in the robbery
that killed Boyer.3 The court granted Hammer a plea bargain for
4
third-degree murder in return for his testimony against Sattazahn.
At trial, the jury found Sattazahn guilty of many charges, including
first-degree murder.5 During sentencing, Justice Keller dismissed the
jury when it could not unanimously decide on a sentence, and then
entered a mandatory life sentence. 6 Sattazahn appealed to the
1. Commonwealth v. Sattazam, 763 A.2d 359, 362 (Pa. 2000).
2. Sattazahn, 763 A.2d at 362.
3. Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 631 A.2d 597, 601 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
4. Sattazahn, 763 A.2d at 364. Hammer had also been sentenced to 240 years in prison
for prior felonies, but because of the bargain against Sattazahn, he could be eligible for
parole for these in just 19 years. Id.
5. Id. at 362. The jury also found Sattazahn guilty of second and third-degree murders,
various counts of aggravated assault, possession of an instrument of crime, carrying a
firearm without a license, and criminal conspiracy. Id.
6. Id. When the sentencing phase ends in a hung jury, the judge has no discretion to
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Superior Court of Pennsylvania, which remanded for a new trial
7
based on erroneous jury instructions.
On remand, the Commonwealth filed a "notice of intent to seek
the death penalty," which the defense attempted to thwart by filing
a motion to "prevent the Commonwealth from seeking the death
penalty" at retrial.8 The Court denied allocatur, resulting in the
second trial for Boyer's deathY On retrial, the jury reinstated
Sattazahn's conviction of first-degree murder but this time
sentenced him to death. 10 On direct appeal to the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, Justice Newman affinmed both Sattazahn's conviction
of first-degree murder and his death sentence."
Justice Newman's analysis began with a routine evaluation of the
sufficiency of evidence to support the elements of first-degree
murder beyond a reasonable doubt. 2 Upon review, the court
issue a sentence and must issue a life sentence. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(c)(1)(v)(1998 &
Supp. 2000).
7. Sattazahn, 631 A-2d at 605-06. The Commonwealth has the burden of proving every
element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, and if a jury instruction is given that
assumes one of the elements of the crime, it relieves the prosecution of proving each
element and is therefore impermissible. Id. At the trial level, there were many instructions
involving these impermissible presumptions. Id. at 606. For example, the Superior Court
found error in the jury instruction regarding the determination of "whether defendant had
the specific intent to kill" because the jury was advised:
[Clonsider all the evidence regarding his words and conduct and the attending
circumstances that may show his state of mind... [A]dditionally, if you believe that
the defendant intentionally used a deadly weapon on a vital part of the victim, you
may regard that as an item of circumstantial evidence from which you may, if you
choose, infer that the defendant had the specific intent to kill.
Id. (emphasis added). The latter part of this instruction allows an impermissible presumption
because it relieves the Commonwealth's burden of proving the element of "intent." Id.
8. Sattazahn, 763 A.2d at 362-63. The Commonwealth, to support its seeking of the
death penalty, revived the aggravating circumstance that Sattazahn had been involved in the
"commission of the killing while in the perpetration of a felony" and also added Sattazahn's
"significant history of felony convictions involving the threat of violence to the person." Id.
at 362. Sattazahn's felony history included several burglaries, a robbery and third degree
murder. Id. at 362-63.
9. Id. at 363. Alocatur is "a word formerly used to denote that a writ or order was
allowed." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 75-76 (Deluxe 6th ed. 1990).
10. Sattazahn, 763 A.2d at 363.
11. Id. at 369. When the lower court issues a death sentence, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court hears an automatic appeal. See infra note 12.
12. Sattazahn,A.2d at 363. "In all cases where the sentence of death has been imposed
this court will conduct an independent review of the sufficiency of evidence supporting the
verdict of guilt on the charge of first-degree murder even where the defendant does not
challenge the verdict." Commonwealth v. Clark, 710 A-2d 31, 34 (Pa. 1998). In Pennsylvania,
to prove murder in the first-degree, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant "unlawfully killed a human being and did so in an intentional, deliberate
and premeditated manner." Sattazahn, 763 A.2d at 363. This "specific intent to kill," which is
solely a characteristic of a murder in the first degree, "may be inferred from the defendant's
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concluded that the evidence presented at trial adequately supported
Sattazahn's conviction. 3
Justice Newman then turned to Sattazahn's contentions that the
defense did not have the opportunity to sufficiently cross-examine
Hammer in order to expose the witness's bias.' 4 The majority held
that the defense had an adequate opportunity to present Hammer's
bias to the jury.'5 The jury heard each facet of Hammer's plea
negotiations, which, Justice Newman determined, presented ample
6
information for the jury to detect any bias he may have had.'
The majority next rejected Sattazahn's argument that a misread
jury instruction hindered the jury's fact-finding ability, reasoning
that the complete jury instruction, not simply portions of it, shall
be taken into consideration.' 7 The 8 court found that the instruction
was clearly presented to the jury.1
Sattazahn also argued that the court erroneously admitted into
evidence his prior offenses and convictions.' 9 Justice Newman
replied that for over sixteen years, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has consistently allowed the prosecution to offer evidence of the
defendant's prior felonies in the sentencing phase "so that a jury
violence sufficient
may assess whether these prior crimes involved
20
to support the aggravating circumstance."
use of a deadly weapon upon a vital part of the victim's body." Id.
13. Id. In addition to Hammer's testimony, an autopsy revealed that the gunshot
wounds throughout Boyer's body were all attributed to the .22 caliber gun that Sattazahn
used the day of the murder. Id. A gun shop owner also testified, confirming that Sattazahn
had purchased from him the gun and two slugs embedded in Boyer's body; several cartridges
found in the parking lot were attributed to the same weapon. Id.
14. Id. Sattazahn asserted that the defense is entitled to an adequate cross-examination
of the witness in order to expose any bias of the witness. Id. at 363-64. Also, it is a general
premise that the jury should be made aware of any bias a witness may have due to gaining a
plea agreement in exchange for his testimony; then the jury can decide whether to credit the
witness's testimony. Id. at 364.
15. Id. The court found that while "the trial court sustained several objections related
to defense counsel's cross-examination of Hammer when counsel asked Hammer to read a
count of the murder charge against him, this ruling did not hinder Sattazahn's ability to show
that Hammer was biased." Id.
16. Id. Hammer had two plea arrangements, which included escaping the death penalty
and becoming eligible for parole in 19 years for his past criminal record, both in exchange
for his testimony against Sattazahn. Id. See supra note 4. Though Sattazahn also argued that
Hammer presented inconsistent statements to the police and that the defense did not have
the opportunity to cross-examine Hammer about these statements, the court rejected this
argument because Hammer had, in fact, admitted to the jury that he lied to police on several
occasions. Id.
17. Sattazahn, A.2d at 363.
18. Id. at 365.
19. Id.
20. Id. Justice Newman relied on the Court's precedent set sixteen years earlier in
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Importantly, Sattazahn's principal challenge was the
"constitutionality of allowing the Commonwealth to seek the death
penalty on retrial" after the court issued a life sentence in the
original trial. 21 He asserted protection from the death penalty under
Pennsylvania's Constitutional provisions guaranteeing a right of
22
appeal and protection from double jeopardy.
However, previously, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Commonwealth v. Martorano relied on United States Supreme
Court precedent to demonstrate that when a defendant's first
conviction is set aside, double jeopardy protection assumes no
limits to the defendant's penalty upon retrial.23 If, at trial, the jury
unanimously determines that the defendant's penalty is something
less than death, the court then considers the sentence to be an
"acquittal on the merits," and precludes the state from seeking the
death penalty on retrial. 24 However, when an "original conviction is
nullified at a defendant's behest, 'the slate [is] wiped clean'" and
the prosecution can seek a greater sentence upon retrial. 25 Justice
Newman explained that, here, like in Martorano, the
Commonwealth permissibly sought the death penalty on retrial
Commonwealth v. Beasley, 479 A2d 460 (1984). Id. at 365. Furthermore, a Pennsylvania
statute provides that a "significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of
violence to the person" is permissible as an aggravating circumstance. 42 PA CONS. STAT. §
9711(d)(9)(1998 & Supp. 2000). Sattazahn's felony history included several burglaries, a
robbery, and third-degree murder. Sattazahn, 763 A.2d at 365.
21. Id. at 366.
22. Sattazahn, 763 A.2d at 366. The Pennsylvania Constitution provides a right of
appeal:
There shall be a right of appeal in all cases to a court of record from a court not of
record; and there shall also be a right of appeal from a court, of record or from an
administrative agency to a court of record or to an appellate court, the selection of
such court to be as provided by law; and there shall be such other rights of appeal as
may be provided by law.
PA- CONST. art. V, § 9.

The Pennsylvania Constitution also provides protection from double jeopardy: "No person
shall, for the same offense, be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ... " PA. CONST. art. I, §
10.
23. Sattazahn, 763 A2d at 366-67 (citing Commonwealth v. Martorano, 634 A-2d 1063,
1068-69 (Pa. 1993)). In BuUington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 434-35 (1981), a sentencing
hearing resembling a trial was conducted during the sentencing phase of a death penalty
case, in which there was opportunity for additional evidence and argument. The jury
unanimously sentenced the defendant to life in prison and on retrial, and the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the state was unable to seek the death penalty because the prosecution had
obviously not proved its case for death in the trial, making this an "acquittal on the merits."
Id. See also Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203 (1984) (relying on propositions set forth in
BuUington).
24. Id. at 366-67.
25. Id.
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because the trial judge imposed the life sentence after dismissing a
hung jury.26
Sattazahn contested this theory, arguing that Pennsylvania's death
penalty statute does not distinguish between a unanimous jury
verdict and a verdict given by a judge resulting from a deadlocked
jury; therefore, both types of verdicts yield an acquittal on the
merits. 27 The majority declined to accept this contention by
reiterating that in Pennsylvania, a "default judgment does not
trigger a double jeopardy bar to the death penalty" upon retrial. 28
Justice Newman's reasoning began by examining the two relevant
subsections of the sentencing statute. 29 The court explained that
subsection (v), which mandates a life sentence in case of a hung
jury, differs from subsection (iv), which allows the sentence of
either life imprisonment or the death penalty; thus, a distinction
must exist between the two or else subsection (v) would be
unnecessary. 30
Consequently, the majority attacked the defense's argument that
the right of appeal, due process, and equal protection provisions of
the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibit the Commonwealth from
seeking the death penalty on retrial. 31 Sattazahn asserted that
Pennsylvania's grant of a right to appeal, one not given in the
26. Id. at 367.
27. "Id.
28. Sattazahn, 763 A.2d at 367 (citing Martorano, 634 A.2d at 1070). The court relied
on the language in Martorano to explain:

Under Pennsylvania's sentencing scheme, the judge has no discretion to fashion
sentence once he finds that the jury is deadlocked. The statute directs him to enter a
life sentence [citation omitted] . . .[A] default judgment does not trigger a double
jeopardy bar to the death penalty upon retrial.
Id.

29. Id. The two relevant subsections of the sentencing statute are 42 PA CONS..STAT. §
9711(c)(1)(iv) and (v). Subsection (iv) provides for the imposition of the death penalty or a
life sentence when the jury unanimously finds sufficient evidence for either. 42 PA CONS.
STAT. § 9711(c)(1)(iv)(1998 & Supp. 2000). Subsection (iv) provides:
The verdict must be a sentence of death if the jury unanimously finds at least one

aggravating circumstance specified in subsection (d) and no mitigating circumstance
or if the jury unanimously finds one or more aggravating circumstances which
outweigh any mitigating circumstances. The verdict must be a sentence of life
imprisonment in all other cases.
§ 9711(c)(1)(iv). Subsection (v) declares that when the jury cannot reach a unanimous
verdict, the court shall impose a life sentence. § 9711(c)(1)(v). It states: "The court may, in
its discretion, discharge the jury if it is of the opinion that further deliberation will not result
in a unanimous agreement as to the sentence in which case the court shall sentence the
defendant to life imprisonment." § 9711(c)(1)(v).
30. Sattazahn, 763 A.2d at 367-68.
31. Id. at 368.
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federal Constitution, affords greater protection than the U.S.
Constitution to defendants on trial.32 Without protection of the right
to appeal, Sattazahn argued that there is a "chilling effect" on the
exercise of this state-granted constitutional right.33 The majority,
reiterating a United States Supreme Court case cited in Martorano,
held that there is no "chilling effect" on a defendant's right to
appeal. 4 The court stated that the Martorano decision remains
applicable law in Pennsylvania
Finally, Sattazahn contended that the court at retrial erred by
allowing the Commonwealth to introduce an additional aggravating
factor.3 6 Renouncing this assertion, the court reiterated that "an
order for a new trial wipes the slate clean" so, although Sattazahn's
crimes and felony convictions "involving the threat of violence to
the person" did not occur until after the first trial, they were
37
permissible as evidence at retrial.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, finding no error, affirmed
Sattazahn's conviction as well as his death sentence.3 Dissenting,
Justice Saylor disagreed with the majority's proclamation that no
"chilling effect" is placed on defendant's right to appeal.3 Justice
Saylor argued that exposing a defendant to the death penalty upon
retrial, after having received a life sentence, certainly places a
chilling effect on this right.40 He claimed that "justice would be
better served" if a defendant is guaranteed on retrial no stricter a
41
sentence than originally received.
32. Id. Sattazahn claimed that Article V of the Pennsylvania Constitution affords
greater protection in its double jeopardy, due process and equal protection provisions. Id.
See supra note 22.
33. Id. at 368. Sattazahn argued that allowing the Commonwealth to seek the death
penalty on retrial "acts as a de facto denial of the right to appeal" and that any "rational
defendant who receives a life sentence imposed by a judge after a hung jury during the
penalty phase will forego his or her appeal for fear of being executed should he or she win
on appeal but lose upon retrial." Id.
34. Id. In Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, the Court stated that "the choice occasioned by the
possibility of a harsher sentence ... does not place an impermissible burden on the right of
a criminal defendant to appeal . . . his conviction." Id. (citing Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412
U.S. 17, 30, 35 (1973)).
35. Sattazahn, 763 A-2d at 368-69.
36. Id. at 369. The court commented that by the time of retrial, Sattazahn "had a
significant history of felony convictions that involve the threat of violence to the person." Id.
See supra note 20.
37. Id. See supra note 25.
38. Id. at 369.
39. Id. (Saylor, J., dissenting).
40. Sattazahn, 763 A.2d at 369 (Saylor, J., dissenting).
41. Id. (Saylor, J., dissenting).
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The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution confers a
right against double jeopardy, that is, that no United States citizen
shall be prosecuted twice for the same crime. 42 In 1896, the
Supreme Court, in United States v. Ball, set the standard with
regard to a court's power to retry a person whose first conviction
has been set aside." In Ball, three defendants were tried for
murder." At the initial trial, two of the defendants were found
guilty of murder while the third was acquitted. 45 Subsequently, on
review, the court dismissed the original indictment but a grand jury
reinstated a new indictment against all three, and a jury found the
three guilty of murder.46 On appeal, the Court was faced with two
issues: (1) whether the formally acquitted defendant was immune
to second indictment because his Constitutional right to freedom
from double jeopardy was violated; and (2) whether the other two
defendants faced a violation of their same rights after the original
indictment had been set aside.47 First, the Court concluded that the
formerly acquitted defendant certainly could not be retried."
Relying on the United States Constitution's Double Jeopardy
Clause, the Court stated that the former acquittal was a bar to the
49
second indictment.
As to the second issue, the majority felt that no bar existed to
the two defendants' retrial. 50 Explaining, the Court held that "a
defendant, who procures a judgment against him upon an
indictment [which is] set aside, may be tried anew upon the same
indictment," whereas "a general verdict of acquittal ... is a bar to
42.
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution
reads:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger,
nor shall any person be subject to the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
Id. (emphasis added).
43. Martorano, 634 A.2d at 1068. (citing United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896)).
44. 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
45. Ball, 163 U.S. at 664-65.
46. Id. at 665.
47. Id. at 666-74.
48. Id. at 669.
49. Id. at 670. The Court stated that an acquittal is absolute, and there exists "no
reason for allowing its validity and conclusiveness to be impugned in another case." Id. See
supra note 42.
50. Ball, 163 U.S. at 672.
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a second indictment." 51 In the end, the acquitted defendant's
conviction was reversed, and the two other defendants' convictions
were

affirmed. 52

confirming
jeopardy

Many

that the
imposes no

decisions

"constitutional

thereafter

guarantee

limitations upon

relied

on

against

Bal,

double

the power to retry

a

defendant who has succeeded in getting his first conviction set
aside."5
Shortly thereafter, in 1919, the Supreme Court in Stroud v.
United States first addressed the question of whether a harsher
sentence could be imposed upon retrial.5 The Court stretched the

basic principle in Ball by averring that the power to retry a
defendant is the power to impose whatever sentence necessary, be

it greater or lesser than the original sentence.5 5 In Stroud, the
defendant was found guilty of first degree murder and was
sentenced to be hanged. 56 After the first conviction was set aside
on error, a second trial ensued and Stroud was again found guilty,
but the jury imposed the punishment of a life sentence. 57 Once

more the judgment was reversed due to error, and at the third trial,
again a jury found Stroud guilty of first-degree murder, and this
time sentenced him to death. 58 On appeal of this sentence, the
Court briefly replied that Stroud's Fifth Amendment double
jeopardy rights were not violated because each trial that ensued

had been set aside due to error.5 9
In following the auspices of Bali, the Court found that no
51. Id. at 669.
52. Id. at 674.
53. Martorano,634 A.2d at 1068.
54. 251 U.S. 15 (1919).
55. Stroud, 251 U.S. at 15-16, 18.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 16. The first conviction was set aside due to a "confession of error by the
U.S. District Attorney." Id.
58. Id. at 17. The second conviction was reversed again due to error by the Solicitor
General of the United States whereby the mandate for vacating the former sentence and
ordering a new trial stated, "such further proceedings be had in said cause, in conformity
with the judgment of this court, as according to right and justice, and the laws of the United
States ought to be had, the said writ of error notwithstanding." Id.
59. Id. at 18. The Court stated:
Moreover, the conviction and sentence upon the former trials were reversed upon
writs of error sued out by the plaintiff in error. The only thing the appellate court
could do was to award a new trial on finding error in the proceeding, thus the
plaintiff in error himself invoked the action of the court that resulted in further trial.
In such cases [the defendant] is not placed in second jeopardy within the meaning of
the Constitution.
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limitation existed to prevent retrying Stroud, and furthermore,
similar to the right to retry a defendant, no limitation exists on the
sentence to be imposed.6° At the second trial in which Stroud was
given a life sentence, the jury instruction read that he shall be
punished "without capital punishment," whereas upon retrial, the
jury heard no such instruction.61 The Court declared that the
difference was immaterial because in the second case, the jury
could have imposed a life sentence, 62but instead found that Stroud
was worthy of the stricter sentence.
More recently, in North Carolina v. Pearce, the Supreme Court,
while reaffirming Ball's basic premise and pulling from the
rationale in Stroud, faced the same question of whether defendants
have a Constitutional guarantee from a harsher penalty upon
retrial.r Stating that Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude a
harsher sentence on retrial, the Pearce court, in examining two
different federal habeas corpus proceedings, gave a more explicit
and extended rationale for its decision than its predecessors." In
both cases, the defendants, Pearce and Rice, were convicted of
crimes and were sentenced to prison terms.6 Each original
conviction was later reversed and set aside in post-conviction
proceedings, and their second trials resulted in longer prison
sentences than those originally issued. 66 Both defendants, in the
habeas corpus proceedings, challenged these increased sentences
by arguing that their Constitutional guarantee, granted in the Fifth
cause them to avoid
Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause, should
67
imposition of a harsher sentence on retrial.
60. Stroud, 251 U.S. at 17-18.
61. Id. at 18.
62. Id.
63. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
64. Id. Habeas corpus is a writ that brings a party before the court, not to establish the
party's guilt or innocence, but to determine whether he is "restrained of his liberty by due
process." BLACK'S LAW DIcrIoNARY 709 (Deluxe 6th ed. 1990).
65. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 713-15. Defendant Pearce was convicted in North Carolina of
"assault with intent to rape" and was sentenced to 12-15 years in prison. Id. Defendant Rice
was sentenced to a term of 10 years in Alabama for four counts of burglary. Id.
66. Id. Pearce's conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court of North Carolina when
Pearce, himself, instituted the post-conviction proceeding. Id. at 713. He was retried,
re-convicted and sentenced to eight additional years. Id. Pearce appealed only to have his
sentence affirmed, and the habeas corpus proceeding ensued. Id. In Rice's proceeding, he
argued that he "had not been accorded his constitutional right to counsel," which resulted in
the original judgment being set aside. Id. at 714. On retrial, he was found guilty of three of
the four original charges and sentenced to a prison term of 25 years before the habeas
corpus proceeding was initiated. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 714.
67. Id. at 714-15. Before the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in the habeas
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The Supreme Court found otherwise when it held that when a
judgment is set aside and a new trial ordered, no Constitutional
limitation exists "upon the power to retry a defendant."68 Justice
Stewart, delivering the majority's opinion, declared this to be a
"well-established part of our constitutional jurisprudence." 69
Justice Stewart's analysis then set forth the basic principle upon
which our most recent decisions are based: "[the rationale that
there exists no Constitutional limitation upon the power to retry a
defendant] ultimately rests upon the premise that the original
conviction has, at the defendant's behest, been wholly nullified and
the slate wiped clean"; therefore, nothing bars a harsher penalty
upon retrial.70 Justice Stewart also addressed the defendants'
challenges of an Equal Protection violation, but again concluded
that there had been no Constitutional violation and reinstated the
71
more stringent penalties.
Twelve years later, the Supreme Court added an exception to the
long-standing premise set forth in Pearce and its predecessors. In
Bullington v. Missouri, the defendant Robert Bullington was
charged with and found guilty of capital murder.72 Following a
sentencing hearing, in which the prosecution offered evidence of
aggravating circumstances, Buffington was sentenced to life in
corpus proceeding, the district courts, affirmed by the relevant Courts of Appeals, agreed
with both of the defendants that their Constitutional rights had been violated by way of
imposing a harsher sentence on retrial. Id. at 713-15. For example, in Rice's case, the trial
court failed to "give him credit for the time he had already served in prison," resulting in the
harsher sentence. Id.
68. Id. at 720-21.
69. Id. at 719-20. Justice Stewart, delivering the majority's opinion, stated: "The
principle that [the Double Jeopardy Clause] does not preclude the Government's retrying a
defendant whose conviction is set aside because of an error in the proceedings leading to
conviction is a well-established part of our constitutional jurisprudence." Id. at 720. (citing
United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 465 (1964)).
70. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 721. (emphasis added). Justice Stewart also added:
To hold to the contrary would be to cast doubt upon the whole validity of the basic
principle enunciated in United States v. Ball and upon the unbroken line of decisions
that have followed that principle for almost 75 years. We think those decisions are
entirely sound, and we decline to depart from the concept they reflect.
Id.
71. Id. at 722-23. The defendants challenged on the Equal Protection basis by stating
that persons "who do not seek new trials, cannot have their sentences increased" and that
there is only "a risk on those who have their original convictions set aside." Id. at 722. The
Court replied, "we deal here, not with increases in existing sentences, but with the
imposition of wholly new sentences after wholly new trials." Id.
72. 451 U.S. 430, 435 (1981). Bullington had abducted and drowned his victim. Id. He
was also charged and found guilty of kidnapping, armed criminal action, burglary, and
flourishing a dangerous and deadly weapon. Id.

2001

Commonwealth v. Sattazahn

prison "without eligibility for probation or parole for 50 years." 73
Bullington requested and was granted a new trial.74 The prosecution
75
filed a formal notice of its intent to again seek the death penalty.
The defense moved to strike, arguing that Bullington's
constitutional rights would be violated if the prosecution was
allowed to seek the death penalty at the retrial. 7 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the
prosecution's seeking of the death penalty at retrial is violative of a
77
defendant's constitutional rights.
Justice Blackmun began answering this question by
reestablishing the Court's traditional standard to be that "the
Double Jeopardy Clause imposes no absolute prohibition against
the imposition of a harsher sentence at retrial after a defendant has
succeeded in having his original conviction set aside."78 Blackmun
then distinguished BuUington from the former cases which
established this basic premise. 79 The difference, he stated, was that

the life sentence imposed on Bullington was granted in a separate
sentencing hearing after facts were presented and the prosecution
had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt certain

elements in order to establish worthiness of the death penalty; in
prior cases, the prosecution recommended appropriate sentences
73. Bullington, 451 U.S. at 435-36. The prosecution offered the following aggravating
circumstances: "the offense was committed by a person... who has a substantial history of
serious assaultive criminal convictions and that the offense was outrageously or wantonly
vile, horrible or inhumane in that it involved torture, or depravity of mind." Id. at 435. The
sentencing hearing consisted of argument, jury instructions and jury deliberation. Id.
74. Id. at 436. The Court granted the new trial to Bullington because of a case, Duren
v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979), decided in the interim. Id. In Duren, the court decided that
"Missouri's constitutional and statutory provisions allowing women to automatically be
exempt from jury service deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to a jury drawn
from a fair cross-section of the community." Id.
75. Id. at 436.
76. Id. at 436-37. Dismissing the defendant's arguments, the Missouri Supreme Court
held:
[N]either the Double Jeopardy Clause nor the Eighth Amendment, nor the Due
Process Clause barred the imposition of the death penalty upon petitioner at his new
trial, and that allowing the prosecution to seek capital punishment would not
impermissibly chill a defendant's effort to seek redress for any constitutional violation
committed at his initial trial.
Id. at 437.
77. Id. Certiorariis the grant of a writ that allows a court to exercise its discretion "to
choose the cases it wishes to hear." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 228 (Deluxe 6th ed. 1990).
78. Bullington, 451 U.S. at 438. (citing Pearce, 395 U.S. at 711 and Stroud, 251 U.S. at
15).
79. Id.
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and the jury used their discretion to determine the sentence.80
Justice Blackmun described the separate sentencing hearing as
"itself a trial on the issue of punishment."8 1 He further explained
that when a state mandates a sentencing hearing that resembles a
trial, that state "explicitly requires the jury to determine whether
the prosecution has 'proved its case,'" making a determination of
the sentence absolutely final. 82

Justice Powell dissented on the basis that the well-settled
precedent the Court set forth in Stroud and Pearce, and other

cases with similar outcomes, is irreconcilable with the majority's
decision. 3 His argument rested on the notion that the Double
Jeopardy Clause does not preclude harsher sentences on retrial,
regardless of whether there was a trial-like sentence hearing;
instead the Clause only precludes a second determination of the

defendant's guilt or innocence.84 Reiterating a previous declaration
of the Court, Justice Powell remarked that a corresponding right of
society is that appropriate punishment be given for the blatant guilt
of a defendant, and in BuUington, it was clear that Missouri
decided that death was the appropriate sentence; therefore, the
Constitution cannot bar the state's sentencing determination.8
Three years later, in Arizona v. Rumsey, Justice O'Connor relied
on BuUington to disallow the death penalty upon retrial because
Arizona, like Missouri, held a trial-like sentencing hearing. 86 The
80. Id.
81. Id. At the statutorily mandated sentence hearing, there were arguments by both the
defense and the prosecution, testimony, jury instructions and then deliberation for the final
determination of sentence. Id.
82. Id. at 444-45. (emphasis removed). Blackmun continued, quoting a former case:
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American
system of jurisprudence, is that the state with all its resources and power should not
be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense,
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to
live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility
that even though innocent he may be found guilty.
Id. at 445 (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957)).
83. BuUington, 451 U.S. at 447 (Powell, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 451 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell stated that a second sentence
determination by a jury is just as "correct" as one given by the first jury. Id.
85. Id. at 452-53. Justice Powell reinforced the U.S. Supreme Court's explanation of its
position in an earlier case on why the Double Jeopardy Clause allows a retrial following a
reversal for error at trial: "Corresponding to the right of an accused to be given a fair trial is
the societal interest in punishing one whose guilt is clear after he has obtained such a trial."
Id. (citing United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964)).
86. 467 U.S. 203, 205, 209-10 (1984). The defendant was found guilty of armed robbery
and first degree murder and after a sentencing hearing, the defendant received life in prison.
Id. at 205. Due to a statutory misinterpretation by the judge, the life sentence was set aside,
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judge in Rumsey sat as the factfinder during sentencing and
rejected the death penalty in favor of a less harsh sentence; thus,
the Court concluded that the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded a
harsher sentence upon retrial.87 After briefly reviewing the
Butlington decision, Justice O'Connor concluded that the similar
facts of the cases, with respect to the sentencing hearing,
warranted direct application of the Bullington decision.88
Therefore, the defendant was protected under the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Constitution.8 9
However, Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Rumsey, fu-mly
asserted that Bullington was wrongly decided, and furthermore
argued that the rationale in Bullington was inapplicable to this
case where the resentencing was "to correct a legal error."90
Distinguishing the facts, Justice Rehnquist stated that the jury in
Bullington was able to use its discretion to decide "if capital
punishment was appropriate," whereas in Rumsey, "the trial judge's
discretion ... was carefully confined and directed to determining
whether certain specified aggravating factors existed. "9' This,
Rehnquist argued, is not the same type of trial-like sentencing
hearing as in Bullington; therefore, different rules should have
92
applied.
Turning the tables in 1986, the Supreme Court, in Poland v.
Arizona, refused to further extend the principle set forth in
Bullington - that the result of a trial-like sentencing hearing is an
"acquittal on the merits" - and returned to the "clean slate" rule
9 3 In
set forth seventeen years earlier in North Carolina v. Pearce.
and in a new sentencing hearing, a debate ensued regarding whether the death penalty could
be imposed the second time around. Id. at 206-08. Eventually, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari. Id. at 209.
87. Id. at 210.
88. Id. at 212
89.

Id.

90. Id. at 213 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
91. Rumsey, 467 U.S. at 213 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 213-14 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist ended:
[Tihe fact that in this case the legal error was ultimately corrected by the trial court
did not mean that the State sought to marshal the same or additional evidence against
a capital defendant which had proved insufficient to prove the State's "case" against
him the first time. There is no logical reason for a different result here simply because
the Arizona Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for the purpose of
correcting the legal error, particularly when the resentencing did not constitute the
kind of "retrial" which the BuUington Court condemned. Accordingly, I would reverse
the decision of the Arizona Supreme Court in this case.
Id. at 214-15 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
93. 476 U.S. 147, 152-157 (1986). See supra notes 63-71 and accompanying text. See also
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Poland, two defendants were convicted of first-degree murder and
at the sentencing hearing, overseen by the trial court judge, the
prosecution presented evidence of two aggravating circumstances,
one of which the trial judge rejected. 94 The judge, weighing the
existing aggravating circumstance against mitigating evidence,
sentenced the defendants to death.9 5 On appeal, the Arizona
Supreme Court found insufficient evidence to support the
aggravating circumstance, and granted a retrial to the defendants
on various bases. 96 However, at the retrial, the prosecution
introduced evidence of the two original aggravating circumstances
and also included a third; the trial judge found positively for all
three circumstances and again sentenced the defendants to death.97
The defendant-petitioners argued that the imposition of the death
penalty on retrial violated their double jeopardy rights because the
Arizona Supreme Court's conclusion that no evidence supported the
original aggravating circumstances "amounted to an 'acquittal' from
the death penalty."9 8
The Supreme Court granted certiorariand Justice White, writing
for the Court, addressed whether "reimposing the death penalties
on petitioners violated the Double Jeopardy Clause." 99 The
majority's analysis began with an overview of the rule expounded
Martorano, 634 A.2d at 1070.
94. Poland, 476 U.S. at 149. Defendants, Michael and Patrick Poland, were found guilty
of murder for disguising as police officers and robbing a cash delivery van of $281,000, then
putting the van's guards in sacks weighted with rocks and into the bottom of a lake. Id. at
148-49. The autopsies showed the guards died either from drowning or a heart attack before
drowning. Id. An aggravating circumstance is "any circumstance attending the commission of
a crime or tort which increases its guilt or enormity or adds to its inurious consequences,
but which is above and beyond the essential constituents of the crime or tort itself." BLACK'S
LAw DICTONARY 65 (Deluxe 6th ed. 1990). In Poland, the prosecution presented evidence of
two aggravating circumstances: "1) that petitioners had 'committed the offense as
consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of something of pecuniary
value' and 2) that petitioners had 'committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or
depraved manner.'" Poland, 476 U.S. at 149. The judge replied that the "pecuniary gain"
circumstance was not present but that the other aggravating circumstance was. Id.
95. Id. A mitigating circumstance is one that is considered by the court, not as a
justification for the offense, but which may be used to reduce "the degree of moral
culpability." BLACK's LAw DICONARY 1002 (Deluxe 6th ed. 1990).
96. Poland, 476 U.S. at 149-50. The defendants appealed on the basis that insufficient
evidence existed to find the "heinous, cruel or depraved" aggravating circumstance, and that
"the jury's verdict was tainted by a jury-room discussion of evidence not admitted at trial."
Id. The court also concluded that the application of the "pecuniary interest" circumstance
was misunderstood at the trial court, and, due to the misunderstanding, it could be
presented again on retrial. Id. at 150.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 151.
99. Id.
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in Bullington and Rumsey, which established that a defendant is
"acquitted" when the prosecution fails to prove its case. 1 ° However,
Justice White distinguished Poland by refusing to apply the
Bullington rule when the fact-finder simply fails to find the
existence of an aggravating circumstance. 10 1 Rather, the appropriate
measure is the "clean slate" rule of Pearce where no constitutional
bar exists to retrial or a harsher penalty, unless the prosecution
has not proved its case for the death penalty, in which case there
is an "acquittal" on the merits. 10 2 Therefore, the court held that the
rejection of an aggravating circumstance was not an acquittal and
"did not foreclose its consideration by the reviewing court."' °3
Furthermore, because the reviewing court did not "find the
evidence legally insufficient to justify imposition of the death
penalty, there was no death penalty 'acquittal.' "104
Justice Marshall, with whom Justices Brennan and Blackmun
joined, dissented with the holding based on a factual difference
between Rumsey and Poland.10 5 In Rumsey, he argued, the
imposition of the death penalty was barred by the Constitution's
Double Jeopardy Clause, "even though the 'acquittal' was
1°6
predicated upon one mistaken interpretation of state law."
Contrarily, in Poland, though the trial court misinterpreted the law,
the majority held because one of the two aggravating
circumstances was affirmed, there was no "acquittal." 0 Justice
Marshall found these outcomes inconsistent and stated that, due to
the factual similarities, the majority should not have made a
distinction between Rumsey and Poland, and should have applied
the rule set forth in Rumsey.' °8
100. Id. at 154.
101. Poland, 476 U.S. at 155-56. Justice White stated "[wie are not prepared to extend
Bullington further and view the capital sentencing hearing as a set of minitrials on the
existence of each aggravating circumstance. Such an approach would push the analogy on
which Builington is based past the breaking point." Id. at 156.
102. Id. at 155, 157. See also Martorano, 634 A.2d at 1070.
103. Id. at 157.
104. Id. Justice White finished by stating that in the Poland case the "clean slate" rule
applied to the second sentencing hearing because of the lack of an acquittal on the merits at
defendants' first hearing. Id.
105. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
106. Poland, 476 U.S. at 157-60 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
107. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 159-60 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall stated:
The initial death sentences that petitioners received were 'convictions' and their
reversal for insufficiency of the evidence to support the sole aggravating circumstance
found by the sentencing judge must be accorded the same effect as an 'acquittal' at
trial - the same effect as Rumsey's life sentence. As much as Rumsey's life sentence
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In 1993, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was presented with the
same question that had been answered by the United States
Supreme Court in this history of cases. In Commonwealth v.
Martorano, a jury found two defendants guilty of first degree
murder and during the sentencing hearing, the judge dismissed the
hung jury and imposed mandatory life sentences on both of the
defendants.1°9 The issue confronted by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court was 'whether "the Commonwealth is precluded from seeking
the death penalty on retrial, where, following their first trial,
respondents were convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced
to life imprisonment, not by a unanimous jury verdict, but by the
trial judge following the jury's deadlock."110
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania began its per curiam
opinion by determining that the state's crimes code requires that
any first degree murder conviction shall be followed by a death
penalty unless there is a clear violation of constitutional rights.,
The court then proceeded to examine whether the constitutional
rights of the defendants had been violated." 2 The majority
discussed the development of the law as evidenced by the
decisions of Ball, Pearce, Bullington, Rumsey, and Poland."3
The defendant-respondents contended that Bullington controlled
because in their case, as in Bullington, the determination of a life
constituted the all-important 'acquittal on the merits' even though predicated on an
error of law, so, too did the reversal of petitioners' death sentences.
Id.
109. Martorano, 634 A. 2d at 1064. The defendants, Martorano and Daidone, hired
Willard Maron to kill, in a "gangland-style slaying," union organizer John McCullough because
McCullough was heading a new union that "would have competed with an existing union
controlled by organized crime." Id. See supra note 23.
110. Id. at 1067-68. Prior to this issue making it to the supreme court, a discrepancy
arose as to whether the trial court and the superior court should have set bail for the
defendants. Id. at 1064-65. The Commonwealth stood firm, declaring that defendants in a
capital case should not be given the "privilege" of being released by bail. Id. However, the
trial court found otherwise and allowed for the defendants' release pending retrial. Id.
111. Id. at 1068. Per Curiam is a Latin phrase meaning "by the court." BLACK'S LAW
Dic'noNARY 1136 (Deluxe 6th ed. 1990). Different from an opinion written by one particular
judge, a per curiam opinion is one that is written by the entire court. Id.
112. Martorano, 634 A.2d at 1068. The court not only determined the lack of a double
jeopardy violation but also denied the existence of equal protection and due process
violations. Id. at 1071.
113. Id. at 1068-70. The court chronologically presented the law as developed in these
prior decisions. It stated that Ball first answered the question as to the propriety of retrying
a defendant by holding that a general acquittal bars a defendant's retrial. Id. The Court
affirmed this principle in. Pearce, then pronounced an exception in in Bullington and
Rumsey. Id. Lastly, the Court returned to the "clean slate" provision of Pearce in Poland v.
Arizona. Id. See supra notes 43-53, 63-82, 88-89, 93-104 and accompanying text.
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sentence in a sentencing hearing was considered an "acquittal on
4
the merits" which precluded a harsher sentence on retrial."
Moreover, the defendants advocated the irrelevance of "whether
the life sentence is the result of a unanimous jury verdict or
imposed by operation of law following a jury deadlock." 115 Both
cases, they argued, were "acquittals on the merits." 11 6 The supreme
court distinguished Martorano from BuUington; in Martorano, the
17
jury did not make the final determination of the life sentence.
Rather, the judge dismissed the jury as hung and imposed a
mandatory life sentence, relieving any decision on the merits." 8 The
court found that "the state had failed to prove its case;"
consequently, the trial judge's statutory duty to impose the life
sentence did not function as an "acquittal"." 9 The court concluded
that the imposition of the death sentence upon retrial posed no
120
violation of the defendants' constitutional double jeopardy rights.
Relying heavily on the decision in Martorano, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Sattazahn addressed identical arguments from
the defendant and concluded with identical results. 21 The decisions
in both cases rested on this long history of United States Supreme
Court decisions. While the Pennsylvania Double Jeopardy Clause
does mirror its federal counterpart, the Pennsylvania cases can be
distinguished from their federal predecessors.
The Right to Appeal Clause in the Pennsylvania Constitution has
no federal counterpart. 122 The prospect of the death penalty upon
114. Martorano, 634 A-2d at 1070.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. In Buiington, the defendant was sentenced in a trial-like sentencing hearing
with the final determination made by a jury. See Bullington, 451 U.S. at 430.
119. Martorano, 634 A.2d at 1070. The court explained:
What respondents fail to apprehend is the significance of the absence of decision in
the instant case ....
The judge makes no findings and resolves no factual matter.
Since judgment is not based on findings which resolve some factual matter, it is not
sufficient to establish legal entitlement to a life sentence. A default judgment does not
trigger a double jeopardy bar to the death penalty upon retrial.
Id.
120. Id. In so holding, the court addressed the respondents' constitutional challenges
that imposing the death penalty on retrial is violative of their equal protection and due
process rights. Id at 1071. The majority relied on Pearce in declaring that no equal protection
violation occurred, because the two totally separate issues "cannot be rationally dealt with in
terms of 'classifications'." Id. The court also relied on Pearce to tackle its due process
challenge, stating that a violation requires "vindictiveness" in imposing a harsher sentence.
Id. at 1071-72.
121. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
122. Sattazahn, 763 A.2d at 368. Article V of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides
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retrial does place a "chilling effect" on this right to appeal. The
court in Sattazahn justified its rejection of this "chilling effect"
theory by averring that the ability to impose a harsher sentence
balances a defendant's "right to a fair trial" with "society's interest
in imposing the appropriate punishment." 1' 3 The court did not
further elaborate except to reiterate that in Martorano, it relied on
a United States Supreme Court case establishing that no "chilling
effect" was created. 124 The court did not delve too far in an attempt
to distinguish the Pennsylvania cases.
History shows that when the sentencing phase resembles a trial
and the jury returns a sentence, there is a bar to a harsher
sentence upon retrial. 125 In Sattazahn, there was a trial-like
sentencing phase. However, the court distinguished Sattazahn on
the basis that the judge was mandated by statute to issue a life
sentence, which was not the equivalent to an "acquittal." Seemingly
contradicting itself, the court also commented that "if the jury's
failure to reach a unanimous agreement as to [a] sentence could
function as a verdict, subsection (v) [of the sentencing statute]
would be superfluous." 26 In essence, a judge's imposition of the life
sentence functions as the voice of the jury when the jury cannot
unanimously agree. It is only sensible that a judge's issuance would
equal an acquittal; otherwise, subsection (v) would be unnecessary.
When a trial judge issues a mandatory life sentence in a trial-like
sentencing hearing, a constitutionally protected right should exist
against the prospect of death upon retrial. To reconcile otherwise
would certainly place a "chilling effect" upon the state-granted right
to appeal. The court's mission of granting a "fair trial" as well as
"society's interest in the appropriate punishment" are both better
served by protecting defendants' rights against a harsher penalty.
The court would grant the defendant a fair trial with a sentencing
hearing in which both the defendant and the jury are made aware
of the possibility of a judge-issued life sentence. As for society's
the Right of Appeal to "the accused in all cases of felonious homicide." PA. CONST. amend. V,
§ 1. See also notes 22, 32, 42, supra.
123. Sattazahn, 763 A.2d. at 368.
124. Id.
125. See BuUington, 451 U.S. at 430; Rumsey, 467 U.S. at 203. See supra notes 79-80,
88 and 89 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
126. Sattazahn, 763 A.2d at 367-68. Subsection (v) of the sentencing statute states:
"The court may, in its discretion, discharge the jury if it is of the opinion that further
deliberation will not result in a unanimous agreement as to the sentence in which case the
court shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment." 42 PA_ CONS. STAT. §
9711(c)(1)(v)(1998 & Supp. 2000). See supra notes 6 and 29.
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interest, there is no doubt that the judge-granted life sentence is an
"appropriate" punishment, as it is mandated by statute.
Perhaps, then, the root of the discrepancy in Pennsylvania is the
existence of subsection (v) of the sentencing statute, which
mandates a life sentence in case of a hung jury. Without it, the
harsher sentence issue would be virtually eliminated, as would the
issue as to whether there had been an "acquittal." As long as the
statute exists, the problem confronted in Sattazahn will remain.
The federal approach is sound, but until the Pennsylvania Courts
are willing to distinguish the subtle differences of Pennsylvania
cases from that of their federal ancestors, the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution imposes no bar to the
death penalty upon retrial after the trial judge has granted a life
sentence on behalf of a hung jury.
Jennifer L. Czernecki

